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Abstract
Background
Crimean Congo Hemorrhagic Fever (CCHF) is a life threatening acute viral infection that
presents significant risk of nosocomial transmission to healthcare workers.
Aim
Evaluation of CCHF infection prevention and control (IP&C) practices in healthcare facilities
that routinely manage CCHF cases in Eurasia.
Methods
A cross-sectional CCHF IP&C survey was designed and distributed to CCHF centers in 10
endemic Eurasian countries in 2016.
Results
Twenty-three responses were received from centers in Turkey, Pakistan, Russia, Georgia,
Kosovo, Bulgaria, Oman, Iran, India and Kazakhstan. All units had dedicated isolation
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rooms for CCHF, with cohorting of confirmed cases in 15/23 centers and cohorting of sus-
pect and confirmed cases in 9/23 centers. There was adequate personal protective equip-
ment (PPE) in 22/23 facilities, with 21/23 facilities reporting routine use of PPE for CCHF
patients. Adequate staffing levels to provide care reported in 14/23 locations. All centers
reported having a high risk CCHFV nosocomial exposure in last five years, with 5 centers
reporting more than 5 exposures. Education was provided annually in most centers (13/23),
with additional training requested in PPE use (11/23), PPE donning/doffing (12/23), environ-
mental disinfection (12/23) and waste management (14/23).
Conclusions
Staff and patient safety must be improved and healthcare associated CCHF exposure and
transmission eliminated. Improvements are recommended in isolation capacity in health-
care facilities, use of PPE and maintenance of adequate staffing levels. We recommend fur-
ther audit of IP&C practice at individual units in endemic areas, as part of national quality
assurance programs.
Introduction
Crimean Congo Hemorrhagic Fever (CCHF) is a life threatening acute viral infection was first
identified in 1944 in the Crimea, and later recognized as the cause of an outbreak in the Congo
in 1969. It is geographically widespread across Africa, Eastern Europe, Asia and the Middle
East [1]. Turkey is the current epicenter of CCHF activity, reporting up to 1000 confirmed
cases annually [2], followed by Pakistan, Iran and Russia. The virus is transmitted to humans
predominantly through tick bites, but also through exposure to blood and tissues of infected
animals and humans [3]. It has a case fatality rate of 4–30% in hospitalized cases and there is
no proven therapeutic or vaccine available [4]. Ribavirin has demonstrated in vitro activity
against CCHFV and is used in some centers, but a meta-analysis of predominantly observa-
tional studies did not show any survival benefit.
Healthcare personnel are at risk from nosocomial infections [5] and the first such cases
were described in Pakistan and later reported from many countries [6–11]. Severe CCHF with
associated hemorrhage presents the highest risk, and failure to recognize the initial non-spe-
cific clinical features of CCHF remains a challenge both in endemic settings and in exported
cases in travelers [5]. Pschenichnaya et al [7], recently reported a fatal case in Russia that
resulted in nosocomial infection of eight healthcare workers (HCWs), whilst Conger et al [8],
also highlighted the risk of exported cases, reporting a fatal case of CCHF in a US soldier evac-
uated to Germany resulting in nosocomial infection of two HCWs. Healthcare facilities can
also act as amplifiers in outbreaks such as in Mauritania in 2003, when the index case directly
infected a total of 15 HCWs, patients and visitors in the ward and emergency room setting,
resulting in six deaths [12].
The route and circumstances of VHF nosocomial transmission are not always well-defined,
but a recent multi-centre study from Turkey, clearly showed that needle stick injury and splash
to mucous membranes were the commonest causes of high risk exposure in healthcare person-
nel. Fatal CCHF cases disproportionately generated more high risk exposures and a range of
HCWs were affected, highlighting the requirement for broad educational programs, focused
on sharps safety, personal protective equipment (PPE) use and early recognition of suspect
CCHF IP&C Eurasia
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cases. The data also suggested a possible post-exposure survival benefit of ribavirin [5](). Sero-
prevalence surveys of HCWs in endemic settings have demonstrated low rates of anti-CCHF
IgG positivity overall [13,14], even when minimal PPE has been utilized. This further supports
the consensus opinion that there is little human to human transmission of CCHFV especially
in mild disease, and that this mostly occurs in nosocomial settings, with severe disease and
well-defined high-risk exposures.
The nosocomial risk of other viral hemorrhagic fevers to healthcare workers was also clearly
highlighted in the recent Ebola epidemic in West Africa, with significant numbers of HCWs
infected [15]. International and national guidance exists detailing the infection, prevention
and control precautions for VHF/CCHF [16], but nosocomial exposure continues to occur in
endemic countries. This project was aimed at evaluating the CCHF IP&C practices in endemic
countries by a cross-sectional survey in health care facilities that routinely manage CCHF
cases. To our knowledge this is the first attempt to collectively survey and report CCHF IP&C
practices in a range of endemic countries and to highlight training requirements.
Materials and methods
A questionnaire was developed to gather information on CCHF infection prevention and con-
trol practices. Through an online platform contact points in the main Eurasian countries
endemic for CCHF were invited to contribute (Fig 1). Respondents were senior physicians and
identified through being: members of World Health Organization CCHF expert panels/
national advisory boards; senior authors from the published literature from CCHF endemic
countries; and as clinical experts working in major CCHF centers. The survey was designed
and conducted as a service evaluation of CCHF IP&C practice in endemic countries and
research and ethical approval was not required. All completed survey responses were received
by April 2016 and respondents who had completed a response to at least one question were
included for analysis. The questionnaire focused on isolation facilities, personal protective
equipment use, infection control practice and educational/training requirements. It included a
combination of closed-ended yes/no and multiple-choice questions, and open-ended ques-
tions for numerical answers (S1 File). We collected background data on the demographics of
each hospital, national diagnostic support and CCHF guideline provision. The results were
summarized in tabular form and analyzed utilizing descriptive statistical methods.
Results
Twenty-three responses were received from centers that regularly manage CCHF in 10 coun-
tries. Fourteen responses were received from Turkey and one from CCHF centers in Pakistan,
Russia, Georgia, Kosovo, Bulgaria, Oman, Iran, India and Kazakhstan. There was a CCHF
National advisory board in 4/10 countries (Turkey, Iran, Georgia, Kosovo) and a CCHF
National reference laboratory in 8/10 countries (Pakistan, Russia, Georgia, Kosovo, Bulgaria,
Oman, Iran and Turkey). National CCHF guidelines existed in 7/10 countries and local hospi-
tal guidelines in 15/23 centers.
Most of the respondents were from Tertiary Healthcare facilities (18/23), all with Infectious
Diseases specialty support. The bed capacity at each facility ranged from 20–2100 beds
(median 646) and the median number of confirmed CCHF cases managed in the last 12
months was 8 (range 1–105, mean 20). The majority of the units (12/23) had managed fatal
CCHF cases in the previous 12 months. The majority of units had a bio-safety level 2 labora-
tory (22/23), with 8/23 having access to a bio-safety level 3 laboratory. The time reported to
receive a CCHF diagnosis by serology after sampling was a median 2 days (n = 21) (range 1–7
CCHF IP&C Eurasia
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days). The time to get a CCHF diagnosis by PCR was a median 2 days (n = 22) (range 1–5
days) (Table 1).
All units had dedicated isolation rooms for CCHF, with 17/23 also having designated isola-
tion rooms in the Emergency Department (Table 2). In the infectious diseases department iso-
lation rooms, there were anterooms in 10/23 (43%), dedicated ventilation systems in 8/23
(34.8%), negative pressure ventilation in 5/23 (21.7%) and High efficiency particulate air
(HEPA) filtration in 4/23 (17.4%) centers. There was cohorting of confirmed cases in the same
rooms in 15/23 centers and cohorting of suspect and confirmed cases in the same room in 9/
23 centers. Relatives were allowed to enter the rooms of confirmed CCHF patients in 7/23 cen-
ters. There were dedicated HCWs to manage CCHF patients in 10/23 centers with adequate
staffing levels to provide care reported in 14/23 locations, although 19/23 reported a reduction
in nursing staff levels for CCHF in-patients overnight. Intensive care level (ICU) support to
Fig 1. Crimean-Congo hemorrhagic fever distribution map with study sites (adapted with permission
from centers for disease control and prevention).
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0182315.g001
Table 1. General characteristics of respondents (23 CCHF centers, 10 countries).
Characteristics
Yes, number (%)
CCHF National Advisory board 4/10 (40)
CCHF National Referral Laboratory 8/10 (80)
National CCHF Guidelines 7/10 (70)
Tertiary care facilities 18/23 (78.3)
Local CCHF Guidelines 15/23 (65.2)
Managed Fatal CCHF cases last 12 months 12/23 (52.1)
Median (range)
Bed Capacity 646 (20–2100)
Total number of CCHF cases last 12 months 8 (1–105)
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0182315.t001
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CCHF patients was available in all facilities (23/23), with dedicated separate ICU rooms avail-
able in 17/23 centers.
There were adequate levels and type of personal protective equipment (PPE) in 22/23 facili-
ties. HCWs routinely utilized PPE on entering the rooms of patients with suspected/confirmed
CCHF in 21/23 centers. Supervised donning and doffing of PPE was undertaken in 14/23 cen-
ters, with a PPE donning & doffing poster available in 18/23 centers. Five centers reported no
supervision or posters to guide donning/doffing PPE. Needle safe devices were utilized in 16/
23 centers and there a formal system for recording CCHF needle stick injuries (NSI) in 22/23
centers. All centers reported having a high risk CCHFV exposure (NSI or splash to mucous
membranes) to a HCW occurring in last five years, with 18 centers reporting 1–5 exposures,
and 5 centers reporting more than exposures (in Turkey and Pakistan). Terminal clean of iso-
lation rooms occupied by CCHF patients is undertaken by 20/23 facilities, with the majority
(18/23) having a special burial protocol for fatal cases.
Education about CCHF was provided to HCWs in 21/23 of the facilities. Education was
provided annually in most centers (13/20), monthly in one center and once only in 7 centers.
Respondents reported adequate provision of training in donning and doffing of personal pro-
tective equipment in 20/23 centers. Additional training requirements were requested in the
following areas: Identification of potential cases 13/23; Isolation procedures 10/23; PPE use 11/
Table 2. CCHF infection prevention and control responses (23 centers).
Characteristics Yes, number (%)
HCWs specifically allocated to CCHF patients 10/23 (43.5)
Adequate staffing to provide care to CCHF patients 14/23 (60.9)
Reduction in nursing staff levels for CCHF in-patients overnight 19/23 (82.6)
Isolation rooms for CCHF patients in the Emergency Department 17/23 (74)
Isolation rooms for CCHF patients in the Intensive Care Unit 17/23 (74)
Isolation rooms in the Infectious diseases have:
- Anterooms 10/23 (43.5)
- Dedicated ventilation systems 8/23 (34.8)
- Negative pressure ventilation 5/23 (21.7)
- HEPA filtration 4/23 (17.4)
Cohorting of confirmed CCHF cases 16/23 (69.6)
Cohorting of suspect and confirmed CCHF cases together 9/23 (39.1)
Relatives allowed to enter CCHF patient rooms 7 /23 (30.4)
Adequate personal protective equipment (PPE) in the facility 22/23 (95.7)
Routine use of PPE when entering CCHF patient’s rooms 21/23 (91.3)
Adequate training in donning & doffing of PPE 20/23 (87)
Supervised donning & doffing of PPE 14/23 (60.9)
PPE donning & doffing posters available 18/23 (78.3)
Number of healthcare worker CCHF exposures in the last 5 years?
- 1–5 18/23 (78.3)
- >5 5/23 (21.7)
Special burial protocol for fatal CCHF cases 18/23 (78.3)
Terminal cleaning of CCHF patient’s rooms 20/23 (87)
Needle safe devices used in CCHF patients 16/23 (69.6)
Frequency of Healthcare worker CCHF education:
- Annually 13/21 (61.9)
- Monthly 1/21 (4.8)
- Once (7/21) (33.3)
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0182315.t002
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23; PPE donning/doffing 12/23; Environmental disinfection 12/23; Disinfection of instru-
ments 11/23; Waste management 14/23; Laboratory protocols 10/23; and prevention of HCW
exposure 12/23 (Table 3).
Discussion
The protection of HCWs and patients from healthcare-related transmission of CCHF is
equally as important as delivery of good clinical care, and underpinned by sound infection,
prevention and control practice. This survey is the first to describe IP&C practice and educa-
tional priorities in centers with significant CCHF expertise in endemic countries in Eurasia.
The centers that participated in the study manage more than 50% of the CCHF cases reported
annually worldwide and are from a range of countries with different resources. The centers
also have experience of managing the spectrum of CCHF disease severity with over 50% man-
aging fatal cases, that present the highest nosocomial risk [5], in the last 12 months.
There is unquestionably a need to improve IP&C practice in endemic countries that is evi-
denced by all centers reporting high-risk exposures in the last 5 years, a quarter of which
reported at least one high risk exposure annually. This is consistent with previous reports and
regularly published cases series in the literature highlighting nosocomial outbreaks [17,18].
Key to HCW protection and prevention of nosocomial transmission is early recognition and
diagnosis of CCHF cases. Molecular diagnosis through RT-PCR took a median of 2 days in the
centers and can be improved through stream-lined processes and surveillance networks, sup-
ported by decentralization of diagnostic testing to endemic areas. In the future, this can be
improved by access to simplified multiplex PCR platforms such as those used in the Ebola out-
break, including the Biofire Filmarray that provides a result in one hour. Equally as important
as rapid diagnosis is heightened clinical suspicion and early risk assessment for VHF/CCHF,
in both endemic areas and in travelers [19]. This allows early isolation of suspect cases, imple-
mentation of appropriate infection prevention and control precautions and reduces risk of
nosocomial transmission. Previous series have highlighted that 25% of HCWs with high risk
exposures to CCHFV came from patients not suspected as having CCHF [5]. Over 50% of cen-
ters in our study requested additional education with respect to identification and triage of
CCHF, consistent with this need.
There was adequate provision of PPE in most centers, although this was not universally uti-
lized by HCWs when entering patient rooms and the type and quality of PPE was not sur-
veyed. One of the key lessons learnt from the West African Ebola outbreak is that the simple
provision of adequate PPE is not enough to protect HCWs. Its use requires training, a safe
Table 3. Additional IP&C training requirements requested by 23 CCHF units.
Training Number (%)
Identification of potential cases 13/23 (56.5)
Isolation procedures 10/23 (43.5)
Personal protective equipment 11/23 (47.8)
Donning & doffing of personal protective equipment 12/23 (52.2)
Environmental/terminal cleaning 12/23 (52.2)
Medical equipment cleaning/disinfection 11/23 (47.8)
Waste Management 14/23 (60.9)
Laboratory protocols for managing CCHF samples 10/23 (43.5)
Prevention of HCW exposure CCHF 12/23 (52.2)
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0182315.t003
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environment and constant vigilance/quality assurance. Doffing of PPE is a recognized high
risk activity, requires multiple steps and ideally should be guided by an external monitor and
with visual aids. Supervised donning and doffing was undertaken in 14/23 centers with 18/23
utilizing posters as visual aids.
Poor compliance to the recommended PPE for CCHF has previously been reported. In
2012 PPE usage and exposures amongst HCWs and laboratory staff that manage CCHF
patients and samples was investigated in a hospital in the hyperendemic region in Turkey, that
has managed over 1200 confirmed cases [20]. Of 190 participants included PPE usage was
reported to be 93.7% for gowns, 77.4% for gloves, and 38.9% for masks; with the highest com-
pliance found in HCWs on the infectious diseases ward. Although there were relatively low
rates of high risk exposures such as needle stick injuries, and only one CCHF IgG positive
result, over 10% reported direct skin contact with blood. Higher seroprevalence rates in
HCWs that manage CCHF cases has been shown in Iran [21]. Another study from Iran also
reported that only 44% of HCWs wore gloves and masks during direct contact with CCHF
patients, and 22% failed to observe any safety measure. HCWs with a history of percutaneous
contact also had significantly lower knowledge scores about the disease [22].
Needle stick injuries are a clear risk for HCWs managing patients with VHF and daily veni-
puncture for CCHF patients is standard in many centers. Regular blood analysis helps recog-
nize organ dysfunction, guide electrolyte replacement and most importantly directs blood
component therapy, a key feature of CCHF case management. Use of needle safe devices
should be universal, but were utilized in only 16/23 of centers, but reassuringly 22/23 had a sys-
tem of recording NSIs. This is important both for subsequent root cause analysis and also con-
sideration of post-exposure prophylaxis with ribavirin.
Protection of other patients and relatives from nosocomial transmission of CCHFV is
equally as important as staff protection. To achieve this healthcare facilities require adequate
isolation capacity from the emergency department through to definitive care by infectious dis-
eases specialists and in intensive care units. Access to intensive care support was universal in
all centers, but only 18/23 had dedicated isolation rooms in emergency departments and inten-
sive care units. In endemic areas where high case-loads are seen cohorting of patients with
confirmed CCHF is appropriate, and practically can be easier and safer for clinical staff. In
endemic areas up to 50% of suspect CCHF cases are RT-PCR negative and it is hard to justify
cohorting confirmed and suspect cases in the same room, as takes place in over one third of
centers.
Although relatives and care-givers may have been exposed to CCHFV pre-admission, it is
difficult to justify the risk of further exposure in a healthcare facility by allowing entry to
patient’s rooms, as was reported by 7/23 centers. As CCHF progresses patients may become
more infectious, and practical solutions can be found to allow relatives to visit without addi-
tional risk. Dedicated ventilation systems/HEPA filtration were only available in a minority of
units, and although experts agree that there is no circumstantial or epidemiological evidence
of an airborne transmission risk from VHF patients [23], a theoretical risk has been postulated
[24]. Aerosol generating procedures, associated with managing critically ill CCHF patients
present challenges, and although dedicated ventilation/filtration may not be required for all
CCHF patients, capacity should be available, particularly in intensive care units. It is important
however to maintain IP&C focus, training and resources on the main routes of VHF transmis-
sion through adherence to universal precautions, avoiding contact with a patient’s body fluids,
minimizing contamination of the environment, and use of appropriate PPE that is fit for pur-
pose and suitable for the person wearing it.
Addition IP&C training requirements were requested by the units in the areas detailed in
Table 3 and should form the basis of future CCHF educational programs. These must be
CCHF IP&C Eurasia
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comprehensive, mandatory and include non-clinical staff and processes such as environmental
cleaning, waste management, and review laboratory protocols for managing hazardous sam-
ples. Handling dead bodies or human remains of suspected or confirmed CCHF patients is a
high-risk activity and although protocols exist in most units (18/23) bespoke training in this
area must be delivered to mortuary/nursing staff. All training must be provided with consider-
ation of susceptibility to human error and requires ongoing quality assurance and re-enforce-
ment. Training was provided on an annual basis by most centers and when possible this
should correlate with the onset of the CCHF season. Safe provision of clinical care to CCHF
patients also requires adequate staffing levels, as well as appropriate equipment and a safe envi-
ronment/processes. Clinical staff need to be highly trained and managing CCHF patients can
be highly intensive, physically demanding and stressful. Recent nosocomial transmission of
CCHF in Spain demonstrated that countries with low risk of CCHF should also train HCWs
in CCHF IP&C and case management [25].
Only 14/23 centers reported adequate staffing levels to manage CCHF caseloads, with
>75% reporting a reduction in nursing levels overnight. Adequate staffing levels is a key com-
ponent of maintaining a safe environment and hospital/unit managers must make this a prior-
ity in line with their duty of care to staff and patients.
The main limitations of the study are that the majority of centers sampled are specialist ter-
tiary referral centers for CCHF, and the results probably do not reflect general practice in
endemic regions. It may be expected that IP&C standards would be higher in these centers,
and the results probably underestimate broader deficiencies in primary /secondary healthcare
facilities that frequently diagnose and initially manage CCHF cases. These are however, major
centers representing locations where the majority of CCHF cases are managed worldwide and
also manage more severe CCHF disease. There appears to be inclusion bias towards Turkish
CCHF centers and this reflects the CCHF case load in Turkey and existing research networks.
The other key limitation related to study design is that the IP&C practice was self-reported by
the lead clinicians at the centers. Without independent additional assessment and audit of
practice at these centers, that is beyond the scope of this study, it is hard to confirm accuracy
of all the results. However, respondents were aware that the results would be anonymized and
most of the key survey responses were objective measurements.
Conclusions
This is the first study to evaluate IP&C practice in countries in Eurasia where CCHF is
endemic. It provides evidence of ongoing nosocomial risk and highlights several areas where
improvements in practice can be made. These include improvements in isolation capacity in
healthcare facilities, particularly to reduce cohorting of suspect and confirmed case, use of per-
sonal protective equipment and maintaining adequate staffing levels. Educational priorities
have been highlighted and we suggest further detailed audit of IP&C practice at individual
units and endemic areas. Guidelines and regular education of HCWs are important, but must
be supported by quality assurance that is overseen by respective Ministries of Health. Staff and
patient safety must be improved and healthcare associated CCHF exposure and transmission
eliminated.
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